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[Crim. No. 7014. In Bank. Oct. 25, 1962.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT 
KARL SIDENER, Defendant and Appellant. 
(1a, Ib] Poisons-Offenses-Punishment.-Where a charge that 
defendant in a narcotics prosecution had been previously con-
victed of the same offense was found to be true by the trial 
court, the judge, at the hearing on probation and sentencing, 
could not dismiss the charge of prior conviction in the absence 
of a motion for dismissal by the district attorney as required 
by Health & Saf. Code, § 11718. That statute is not invalid 
as being in violation of Const., art. VI, § 1, vesting the judicial 
power of the state in the Senate and in the various courts, or 
of Const., art. III, § 1, dividing the state govcrnment into legis-
lative, executive and judicial departments and providing for 
the separation of powers of such departments, since courts are 
not the only public agencies constitutionally empowered to 
determine the punitive consequences of recidivism. (Disapprov-
ing statements or implications to the contrary in People v. Burke, 
47 Ca1.2d 45, 52 [301 P.2d 241]; People v. Valenti, 49 Ca1.2d 
199, 206 [316 P.2d 633J.) 
[2] Id.-Offenses-Punishment.-In Health & Saf. Code, § 11718, 
providing that in a narcotics prosecution no allegation of fact 
which, if admitted or found to be true, would change the 
penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, §§ 35, 48; Am.Jur., 
Drugs and Druggists (rev ed § 31 et seq). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2] Poisons, § 16; [3,4] District Attor-
neys, § 11; [5] Constitutional Law, § 60. 
) 
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otherwise have been may be dismissed by the court or stricken 
from the uccusatory pleading except on motion of the district 
attorney, the Legislature has adopted part of the prosecutor's 
common-law power of nolle prosequi, which included the power 
to strike allegations that would increase punishment. 
[31 District Attorneys-Powers-Nolle Prosequi.-The district at-
torney's common-law power of nolle prosequi has not been 
abrogated by Const., art. VI, § 1, vesting the judicial power 
of the state in the Senate and in the various courts. 
f41 ld. - Powers - Nolle Prosequi. - The fact that Pen. Code, 
§§ 1385, 1386, providing that a court may order a prosecution 
dismissed and abolishing the entry of a nolle prosequi, were 
necessary to give. to the courts the power traditionally vested 
in prosecutors demonstrates that the common-law rule relating 
to nolle prosequi was not ubroguted by the general language 
of the Constitution vesting the "judicial power" in the coUrts 
(Const., art. VI, § 1). 
[51 Constitutional Law-Statutes-Wisdom.-Whether the Legis-
lature has adopted the wisest and most suitable means of 
accomplishing an object is no concern of the courts. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John F. Aiso, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of 
conviction affirmed. 
Ellery E. Cuff, Public Defender, Fred Kilbride and James 
L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction on an information charging him with possession of 
a narcotic (heroin) in violation of Health and Safety Code· 
section H500. The trial court also found to be true the charge 
that defendant had been convicted of violating the same 
section in 1955. [1a] At the hearing on probation and 
sentencing the trial judge refused to consider dismissal of 
the charge of prior conviction on the ground that the district 
attorney had made no motion for dismissal as required by 
[3] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, District and Prosecuting Attorneys, § 13. 
) 
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Health and Safety Code section 11718.1 Probation was denied 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11715.6) and defendant was sentenced 
to an inerease'd term as a second offender. (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11500.) 
The Legislature has determined that recidivists should be 
punished more severely than first offenders (e.g., Pen. Code, 
§§ 644, 1203, 3020, 3024, 3047-3048.5; Health & Saf. Code, 
§§ 11500, 11501, 11502, 11530, 11531, 11532, 11540, 11557, 
11715.6) and has directed that charges of recidivism in nar-
cotics cases shall not be dismissed except upon motion of the 
district attorney. 
Defendant contends that the power to dismiss such charges 
is vested exclusively in the courts by article VI, section 12 and 
article III, section P of the California Constitution, and that 
Health and Safety Code section 11718 is therefore invalid. 
This contention is unsound. Any statements or implications in 
Peoplev. Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 52 [301 P.2d 241], and People v. 
Valenti, 49 Ca1.2d 199, 206 [316 P.2d 633], to the contrary 
were not necessary to the holdings in those cases and are dis-
approved. 
[2] In section 11718 the Legislature has adopted part 
of the prosecutor's common-law power of nolle prosequi, which 
inclnded the power to strike allegations that would increase 
punishment. (State of Maine v. Burke, 38 Me. 574, 575; 
Anonymolls, 31 Me. 590; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 
Pick.) 356, 364-367; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 24 Mass. (7 
Pick.) 177,178-179; Baker v. State of Ohio, 12 Ohio St. 214, 
217-218.) [3] That power, hundreds of years 01d4 and 
"'In any criminal proceeding for violation of any provision of this 
division no allegation of fact which, if admitted or found to be true, 
would change the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty 
would be if such fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be true 
may be dismissed by the court or stricken from the accusatory pleading 
except upon motion of the district attorney." 
·"The judicial power of the State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting 
as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, district courts of appeal, 
IUperior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts." 
'''The powers of the Government of the State of California shall be 
divided into three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and 
judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly be-
longing to one of these departments shall exercise any functions apper-
taining to either of the other~, except as in this Constitution expressly 
directed or permitted." 
'An incident related in 2 Campbell's Lh'cs of the Chancellors 173 is of 
interest in this connection. After he had ordE'red the imprisonment of a 
croup ot fanatics called "Prophets" for seditious language, Lord Holt 
was visited by Lacy, one of their friends, who informed a servant that he 
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still recognized in mallY jurisllictiulls Ilflving constitutional 
provisions essentially idcnti<:al wii It 8l'etion 1 of artiele VI 
(United Stafes v. Brokaw (D.C. II!.) 60 F.Supp. 100, 101; 
State v. Broussard, 217 La. :)0, !:Ii) [-16 So.2<1 48] ; Stale v. 
Kearns (Ohio Com. Pl.) 129 N.E.2d j43, 543; State v. CharIeR, 
183 S.C. 188, 194 [190 S.E. 466] ; see 69 A.L.R. 240, 241-243), 
was not abrogated by that section. The phrase "judicial 
power" cannot reasonably be given a meaning that it has never 
before been thought to have in this or allY other state to 
invalidate an act of the Legislature. Courts are not the only 
public agencies constitutionally empowered to determine the 
punitive consequences of recidivism. 
The contention that prosecutors have ncver had the common-
law power of nolle prosequi in this state is based solely on 
the enactmrut at the first and second legislative sessions (Stats. 
1850, ch. 119, p. 323; Stats. 1851, eh. 29, p. 279) of the prede-
cessors of Penal Code sections 1385 and 1386.5 Thus it was a. 
legislative act, not a constitutional provision, that deprived 
prosecutors of such power in California. In the exercise of the 
same power by which the 1850 and 1851 Legislatures rejccted 
nolle prosequi, the 1959 Legislature chose to restore it in part. 
[ 4] The fact tha.t sections 1385 and 1386 were necessary to 
give to the courts this power traditionally vested in prosecu-
tors demonstrates that the common-law rule was not abrogated 
by the general language of the Constitution vesting the" ju-
dicial power" in the courts. 
The Legislature has never completely rejected the prosecu-
tor's common-law power of nolle prosequi. The same Legisla-
carried a message" from the Lord God." Lar.y was admitted and told 
Lord Holt: "I come to you a prophet from the Lord God, who has sent 
me to thee, and would have thee grant a nolle prosequi for John Atkins, 
his servant, whom thou hast cast into prison." Lord Holt replied: 
"Thou art a false prophet, an,1 a lying knave. If the Lord God had 
sent thee it would have been to the Attorney·General, for He knows that 
it belO1lgeth not to the Chief Justice to grant a nolle prosequi; but I, 
a8 Chief Justice, can grant a warrant to commit thee to bear him com· 
pany." (See Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice (9th ed. 1889) 
§ 383, p. 268, fn. 2.) 
'Section 1385 provides: "The court may, either of its own motion or 
upon the application of the pros('cuting attoTlley, anil in furtherance of 
justice, order an action to be di~missed. The r,'n"ons of the dismis.nl 
must be set forth in an orcler eniered lIpon the l1linllj·l'~. No dismh~al 
shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the 
accusatory plealling." 
Section 1386 provides: "The entry of a nolle pro~eqlli is abolishecl, 
and neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney can discontinue 
or abandon a prosecution for a public offense, except as provided in the 
last section." 
Oet. 1962] PEOPLE ". SIDENER 
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ture tlmt cuaetcd tlle pr('dc(!essors of section 1385 and 1386 in 
1850 and 1851 also adopted the predeccssor of Penal Code 
section 1099 which provides: "When two or more defendants 
are included ill the same accusatory pleading, the court may, 
at any time before the defendants have gone iuto their defense, 
on tlte application of the prosecuting attorlley, direct auy 
defendant to be discharged, that he may be a witness for the 
people." (Italics added.) In People v. Bruzzo, 24 Ca1. 41, this 
court was confronted with the question whether a court had 
authority without a motion for dismissal by the district attor-
ney to dismiss a joint defendant so that he might become a 
witness for the people. The distriet attorney, as in the present 
case, had dcclined to move for dismissal. It was held that" The 
Court has no power to discharge Bruzzo at common law, nor 
under the Act of 1851, 011 the motion of his own counse1." 
(24 Cal. at p. 51.) 
The Bl·lIZZ0 case demonstrates that the power of dismissal 
is not vested exclusively in the courts, but may be given to the 
prosecutor by the Ij('gislature. Health and Safety Code section 
11718 giws the district attorney the same power with respect 
to dismissal or charges of recidivism in narcotics cases that 
Penal Code section 1099 gives him with respect to dismissal 
of charges against joint defendants. Both sections are a partial 
legislative adoption of the prosecutor's eommon-Iaw power of 
nolle prosequi. 
The Bruzzo rase cannot be distinguished on the ground that 
dismissal of a cbarge of a prior conviction is effective only for 
sentencing purposes. The common-law power of nolle prosequi 
in<'luded dismissal of the prosecution entirely or any sepa-
rable part thereof. Charges could be dismissed by entry of a 
nolle prosequi before the jur~' was impanelled, while the case 
was before the jury, or after vcrdict. (See Wharton, Criminal 
Pleading and Practice (9th ed. 1889) § 448, p. 313; 14 Am. 
Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 296-298,pp. 967-968; 22A C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, § 457a, pp. 3-4.) 
The meaning of constitutional provisions, however, is not 
static, and the scope of jud~cial po",:er is not found in history 
alone. The definition Rnd classification of public offenses and 
the punishment therefor arc legislative matters. (Harbor 
Comrs. v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 493 [26 P. 375, 
22 Am.St.Rep. 321]; Ex Parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21; Moore v. 
Municipal Court, 170 Cal.App.2d 548, 556 [339 P.2d 196].) 
If charges have not been dismissed pursuant to the authority 
granted by the Legislature, the court must pass sentence as 
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pt'eseribed by statute (Pen. Code, § 12) and may not illlPose 
any sentence other than that prescribed. (People v. Gonzales, 
36 Cal.App. 782, 784 (173 P. 407] ; see also Pen. Code, § 1203 
et seq. relating to probation and suspension of sentences.) 
[1 b] The charge of a prior conviction in the present case 
has not been dismissed pursuant to legislative authority. The 
court found that the charge was true and was therefore bound 
to impose the sentence prescribed by law. The court could 
no more dismiss this charge without statutory authority than 
it could dismiss a charge against any defendant convicted of 
murder, arson, rape or any other crime. A court may feel 
that the punishment prescribed by the Legislature for a 
recidivist narcotics offender is too severe or that by dismissing 
one or more charges punishment can be imposed that would 
better serve to rehabilitate him. To dismiss the charges in the 
face of Health and Safety Code section 11718, however, would 
be a flagrant usurpation of legislative power and an arrogant 
affectation of wisdom in the matter of punishment and rehabil-
itation superior to that of the Legislature. Certainly article VI, 
section 1 and articlc III, section 1 do not endow courts with 
such power. 
The fact that prior convictions are now given greater weight 
than they once were does not distinguish them from the host 
of other considerations of penology that are now given greater 
or lesser weight than they once were or compel the conclusion 
that their punitive effect is for the courts alone. Like pre-
meditation or malice aforethought in homicide or bodily harm 
in kidnapping, prior convictions have been made operative 
facts for the determination of punishment. Every day prose-
cuting attorneys exercise broad powers in this respect. It is 
they who decide what crime is to be charged or if any crime 
is to be charged. (Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Ca1.2d 
671, 676 (227 P.2d 14] ; see Klein, District Attorney's Dis-
cretion Not to Prosecute, 32 L.A.B. Bull. 323-334; Note, 
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for D·istrict Attorneys' Un-
warranted Inaction, 65 Yale L.J. 209; Remington & Joseph, 
Oharging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple Oriminal 
Offender, '1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 530; Wright, Duties of a 
Prosecutor, 33 Conn. B.J. 293-295.) Moreover, it is only 
because the Legislature so directed that they are bound to 
charge all prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 969) once the deci-
sion to prosecute is made. It would exalt form over substance 
to hold that broad constitutional principles of separation of 
powers and due process of law permit vesting complete dis-
) 
) 
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cretion in the prosecutor before the case begins, but deny him 
all such discretion once the information is filed. 
There are innumerable facts other than the commission of 
the crime itself that may have far more bearing on the punish-
ment imposed than prior con\'ictions. If not only their exist-
ence but their effect on punishment must be determined solely 
by courts, the indeterminate sentence law and the legislative 
restrictions on the court's power to grant probation must fall. 
The indeterminate sentence law has been sustained, however, 
on the theory that a conviction carries with it judicially deter-
mined liability for the maximum sentence and that any remis-
sion from tl1at maximum may be determined by an administra-
tive agency (In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-693 [171 P. 958] ; 
Inre Wells, 35 Ca1.2d 889, 893 [221 P.2d 947]; In re Smith, 
33 Ca1.2d 797, 804-805 [205 P.2d 662]), subject only to 
limited judicial re\'iew_ (In re McLain, 55 Ca1.2d 78, 87 [9 
Cal.Rptr. 824, 357 P.21l 1080].) The Legislature could provide 
life imprisonment as the maximum term for all narcotics con-
victions without possibility of probation, and it could leave it 
solely to the Adult Authority to determine the punitive effect 
of prior convictions. It could set out standards to govern the 
Adult Authority and provide for judicial review of its findings 
with respect to relevant facts. It might, for example, provide 
that prior convictions should be determined, not at the trial 
but by the Adult Authority at a subsequent hearing subject 
to judicial review. Surely it could not reasonably be contended 
that in such a review proceeding the judicial power included 
not only a revie,v of the facts, but the power to instruct the 
Adult Authority to ignore them. 
The Legislature has been given express constitutional power 
to determine what officers, agencies or boards m~y exercise 
the power now exercised by the Adult Authority and the scope 
of such powers.s The Legislature is authorized to provide that 
part of the powers that might otherwise be exercised by the 
Adult Authority alone shall be exercised by district attorneys_ 
CArticle X, section 1 (formerly section 7) of the California Constitu-
tion provides: "The Legislature may provide for the establishment, gov-
ernment, charge and lIuperintendence of all institutions for all persons 
convicted of felonies. For this purpose, the Legislature may delegat.e the 
government, charge and superintendence of such institutions to any pub-
lic governmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards, whether 
now existing or hereafter created 11y it. Any of such agencies, officers, or 
boards shall have such powers, perform such duties and exercise such func-
tions in respect to other reformatory or penal mntters, as the Legislature 
may prescribe. ' • 
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In determining that the district attorucy rather than the 
Adult Authority or the trial court shall ha"e primary respoll-
sibility for determining the punitive consequences of recidi-
vism in the illdividuaillureotics ease, the Lcgislature in the 
exercise of its cOllstitutiollal power has simply chosen one 
. public officer rather than au other. Some judges may think 
they are best qualified to make this determination ; some dis-
trict attorneys may think they are; others may think that 
neither judges nor district attorneys should be entrusted with 
that responsibility. In section 11718 of the Health and Safety 
Code the Legislature has designated the district attorney as 
the officer that can best effect the public policy of the state. 
[5] '" [I]t is not our concern ,vhether the Legislature has 
adopted what we might think to be the wisest and most. suit-
able means of accomplishing its objects.' " (State of Califor-
nia v. Industrial Ace. Com., 48 Cal.2d 365, 372 [310 P.2d 7], 
quoting City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal.2d 804, 811 
[306 P.2d 453].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J.,Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my view section 11718 of 
the Health and Safety Codet (both by its terms and as applied 
here during the trial of the defendant in the superior court 
on the felony charge of possessing a narcotic drug in violation 
of section 11500 of the same code) is unconstitutional under 
both the United States and California Constitutions in that it 
denies the defendant due process of la,v in the adjudication of 
material issues affecting probation and sentence (U.S. Const., 
5th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13). In particular, 
section 11718 has deprived the defendant at bench of his 
constitutional right to have a judicial officer (the trial judge) 
hear, and in the exercise of discretion vested exclusively in 
that officer determine, the important question of dismissal of a 
charge of a prior conviction (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 1, 5; Pen. 
~ 
'Health and Safety Code section 11718, enacted in 1959, provides: 
, 'In any criminal proceeding for violation of any provision of this 
division [" Narcotics," H 11000-11797] no GllegGtilm of ftlCt [in an in-
dictment or information] whil'h, if admitted or found to be true, would 
change the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would 
be if such fact were not alleged and admitted or prol"ed to be true mGY 
be dismi8sca by the court or strickc. from the GCCUBGtory pZeGdi1lg except 
upo. motion of the di8trict Gttorney." (Ita.lies added.) 
I 
i 
I 
I 
) 
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Code, §§ 995, 1238, and 13852 ); furthermore, by subjecting 
the exercise of an inherently judicial function to the unreview-
able discretion of a member of the exeeuth'e branch, the subject 
section violates the constitutional requirement of separation of 
powers (Cal. Const., art. III, § 1). 
The general asseverations of the majority as to the powers 
of the Legislature to fix punishments for criminals, to differ-
entiate among crimes and between first offenders and recidi-
vists, and to prescribe the conditions for probation or parole, 
etc., are of course unquestioned. But the elaboration of such 
undoubted fundamentals should not be allowed to obscure the 
issue. Certainly the Legislature could absolutely prohibit the 
granting of probation or parole to anyone convicted of a nar-
cotics (or any other) offense; or it could ordain any minimum 
and maximum terms it sees fit, or a mandatory life term with-
out parole or even a nondiscretionary death penalty for such 
offenses. But thc Legislature cannot-without transgressing 
our constitutional division of powers-transfer from the judi-
cial to the executive branch of government the power either 
to grant or to deny, or to preclude judicial resolution of, a 
motion made prior to entry of judgment in a felony criminal 
action, the ruling on which will affect the substantial rights 
of the defendant under the judgment to follow. 
Section 11718 actually goes farther than to transfer a seg-
'Section 1385 reads: "The court may, either of its own motion or upon 
the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, 
order an action to be dismissed. The reasons of the dismissal must be set 
forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made 
for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory 
pleading. " 
Section 995 defines certain situations (none of which, as such, is mate· 
rial here except as recognizing the inherent power of the court to act) 
wherein the "indictment or information must be set aside" upon motion 
of the defelldallt. 
Section 1238 evidences implied powers of tbe trial court by providing 
that" An appeal may be taken by the people: 
"1. From an order setting aside the indictment, information, or 
complaint; •.. 
"5. From an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial 
rigbts of the people; 
"6. From an order modifying the \'t!rdiet or fimling hy reducing the 
degree of the offense or the p\lni~hment imposed." 
It should be noted here (as is hereinllfter in tbe text shown in more 
detail) that the power to control the eausc--inrlll<ling the power to dis· 
miss or to set asirle an accusatory pleading or portion thereof-is not 
created by the mentioned colle sections. That power stems from the 
Constitution and is merely regulated procedurllll!l hy the (lirectives of 
the pertinent statute, sueb as, e.g., section 1385, requiring that the rea. 
sons for the dismissal of an action be set forth in an order entered in 
the minutes. 
) 
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mcnt of the judicial power to the cxccutive. It unquestionabJy 
purports to curtail the jurisdiction of the court by granting to 
the district attorney the unreviewable and absolute power 
(with no standard prescribcd for its cxercise) to preclude the 
judge from exercising any discretion in ruling on a motion in a 
criminal action for an order which would substantially affect 
the defendant's eligibility for probation, parole and the tcrms 
of his imprisonment. It bears reiteration that the Legislature, 
of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, 
parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the 
judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the 
district attorney. 
Section 11718 by its very terms tacitly recognizes-as under 
the Constitution is implicit-that the court has jurisdiction to 
entertain and pass on a motion for the relevant relief. But as 
to the judge's exercise of the court's jurisdiction in ruling on 
any such motion the statute directs that "no allegation of fact 
[in an indictment or information filed with the court] which, 
if admitted or found to be true, would change the penalty for 
the offense charged from what the penalty would be if such 
fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be truc may 
be dismissed by the court or stricken from the accusatory 
pleading except upon motion of the dist1'ict attorney." (Italics 
added.) Constitutional jurisdiction of the court to act cannot 
be turned on and off at the whimsy of either the district attor-
ney or the Legislature. The power to act under our system of 
government means the power of an independent court to 
exercise its judicial discretion, not to servilely wait on the 
pleasure of the executive. 
The majority summarize (ante, p. 646) the trial court's 
action on the question of dismissal of the charge of defendant's 
prior conviction, but fail to quote the following illuminating 
language of the trial judge: 
"THE COURT: ... Is there any legal cause why judgment 
should nbt be pronounced and sentence passed' 
"MR. KILBRIDE [deputy public defender] : I am in doubt-
there is no legal cause other than I do not know yet what the 
decision of the District Attorney was. 
"THE COURT: I will let that be made known to you at this 
time. The District Attorney after due deliberation has declined 
to initiate a motion to strike the prior conviction alleged. It 
[Health & Saf. Code, § 11718] therefore ties the hands of thi.~ 
Court in which the Court has 110 discretion." (Italics added.) 
Accordingly, the court (deeming the subject statute to be 
PEOPLE V. SIDENER 
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valid) did not in the exercise of its jurisdiction determine, but 
was compclled by the district attorney's action to deny, proba-
tion (Health & Saf. Code, § 11715.6 post, fn. 12) and to sen-
tence defendant to state prison for an increased term (Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11500). The judge's action in imposing the 
increased term was compellcd not by legislative determination 
that the longer term prescribed in section 11500 must in any 
event follow conviction of the offense, but only by the deter-
mination of the district attorney-on no standard prescribed 
by law-that as to this particular defendant he would pre-
clude the court from exercising its discretion in a matter 
which otlwrwise was within thc court's jurisdiction. In other 
words, the district attorney exercised his absolute discretion 
and section 11718 compelled the judge to abdicate the function 
of his office. In the next case to follow, before the same judge, 
the district attorney (again subject to no prescribed standard) 
might elect to permit that defendant to have the benefit of the 
judge's exercise of discrction on the same motion. Has the 
defendant here had due process and equal protection of the 
law! 
The Legislature, of course, could have prescribed the longer 
punishment for conviction of the offense defined; but it could 
not transfer from the judicial to the executive-from the judge 
to the lawyer for the state-any part of the judicial power; 
nor could it create in the executive a totalitarian type of super-
power to curb the judiciary. As declared by this court, unani-
mously, in Vidal v. Backs (1933) 218 Cal. 99, 104 [2] [21 
P.2d 952, 86 A.L.R. 1134], " [W] e must bear in mind a funda-
mental principle of government applying to constitutional 
courts to the effect that they constitute an independent branch 
of government which cannot be hampered or limited in the 
discharge of its functions by either of the other two branches. " 
(Italics added.) 
Article VI, section 1, of the California Constitution provides 
that ,. The judicial power of the State shall be vested in the 
Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, 
district courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, 
and justice courts." Section 5 of the same article specifies that 
"The superior courts shall have original jurisdiction in all ... 
criminal cases amounting to felony .... " The criminal action 
against defendant, which was on trial in the superior court 
when the judge's power was curtailed by force of the district 
attorney's action in reliance on the statute, charged simple 
possession of a narcotic, a felony. Neither section 11500 nor 
) 
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section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code distinguishes 
between simple possession by a sick addict and like possession 
by a nonaddiet. A trial judge can-for obvious humanitarian 
reasons-make that distinction. It is this power of the trial 
judge to temper the universality of a harsh law which makes 
this case important to the cause of justice. It is important to 
the integrity of our constitutional government for reasons 
which will be more fully developed. 
Significantly, neither in article VI nor elsewhere in the 
Constitution is there to be found a definition of the content 
of the phrase, "The judicial power of the State," as used in 
section L It follows that a necessary corollary to that general 
language is the principle that "Our courts are set up by the 
Constitution without any special limitations ; hence the courts 
have aud should maintain vigorously all the inherent and im. 
plied powers necessary to properly and effectively function as 
a separate department in the scheme of our state government." 
(Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442 [1] [281 
P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507].) The latter principle was described 
by this court as long ago as 1929 as being" now undebatable" 
(id. at p. 442) ; the integrity of this holding has heretofore 
been continuingly respected (see, e.g., Garrisonv. Rourke 
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 430, 436 [3] [196 P.2d 884] ; J[irstowsky v. 
Superior Court (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 745,753 [6] (300 P.2d 
163)). 
The implied powers of a constitutionally created court are 
those which are necessary to enable it to properly and effec-
tively exercise the fundamental judicial power granted by 
article VI, section 1. " A court set up by the Constitution ha.<! 
within it the power of self-preservation, indeed, the power to 
remove all obstructions to its successful and convenient oper-
ation." (Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 33 [4] [293 
P. 69] ; Rivas v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 195 Cal.App. 
2d 406,409-410 [2] [15 Cal.Rptr. 829] ; Arc Investment Co. v. 
TifJith (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 853, 856 [7] [330 P.2d 
305].) Certain of these implied powers have received legisla-
tive deJlnition;3 but in each instance the enactment neither 
created nor circumscribed the powers thus defined. Thus, as 
'Code of Civil Procedure section 128 provides: 
"Powers respecting conduct of proceedings. Every court shall have 
power: 
"1. To preserve and enforce order in its immcilillte presence; 
"2. To enforce order in the procce<1ings before it, or before a person 
or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its 
authority; 
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hereinabove noted in footnote 2, th(' provision of Penal Code 
section 1385 that" The court may, either of its own motion or 
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in fur-
therance of justice, order an action to be dismissed" is not a 
grant of jurisdiction to dispose in a particular way of the 
actions pending before it. The court, by 'virtue of the eonsti-
. tutional provisions above mentioned, already has the complete 
power to fully adjudicate and, subject only to judicial review, 
finally dispose of, all causes eueolJipassed in the constitutional 
grant. The additional language in section 1385 (" The reasons 
of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the 
minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause which 
would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading. ") 
obviously does not limit the jurisdiction or power of the court 
to control the justice of the cause but relates only to procedural 
matters. The essentially inherent or implied powers of the 
court are by their nature impradieable if not impos3ible of 
all-inclusive enumeration.4 
"3. To provirle for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its 
officers; 
"4. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and 
to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pend· 
ing therein ; 
"5. To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial 
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto; 
"6. To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action or 
proceeding pending therein, in the cases and manner provided in this 
code; 
"7. To administer oaths in an action or proceeding pending therein, 
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of ita 
powers and duties; 
"8. To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them 
conformable to In wand justice." 
Code of Civil Procedure section 177 provides: 
"Powers of judicial officers as to conduct of proceedings. Every judi-
cial officer shall have power: 
"1. To preserve and enforce order in l1is immediate presence, and in 
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official 
duty; 
"2. To compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided in this code; 
"3. To comWJI the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding 
before him, in the cases and manner provided in this code; 
"4. To administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before 
him, and in all other cases where it· may be necessary in the exercise of 
his powers and duties." 
'This fact is implicitly recognized, in one context, in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 187: 
"Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. When jurisdiction is, by the 
constitution or this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court 
or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also 
aiveu; ... J' 
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The majority, trying to tind support· for the Legislature's 
attempt to empower the executive to curtail the superior 
court's jurisdiction in the premises, say that" In sectioll 11718 
the Legislature has adopted part of the prosecutor's commOll-
la,v power of nolle prosequi, ,vhieh included the power to 
strike allegations that would increase punishment." (Ante, 
p.647.) In so stating, the majority purport to proceed from 
the undocumented assumption (a lite, pp. 647-648) that in 
California the common law power of llolle prosequi "was not 
ahrogated by" the adoption of article VI, section 1, of our 
Constitution. But the majority :l1eglect to point out that his-
torically the common-law doctrine 01 'II01le prosequi appears 
nevcr to have bcen in 101'ce in California. It is not shown to 
have been a part of the Mexican law nor was it ever enacted 
by the Legislature or otherwise adopted by the People. As the 
majority appear to have overlooked these facts, a short excur-
sion into legal history is necessary to demonstrate this propo-
sition. 
California, as a governmental entity, is not of common-law 
ancestry. At the time of the first influx of American settlers 
in the early 1840 's the operating judicial system was Mexican. 
That system appears to have been rudimentary at best in the 
southern portion of the province and nonexistent in the north. 
(See Mason, C011stitutional History 01 California, in Consti-
tution of the State of California and Other Documents (1961, 
Calif. State Senate), p. 319; Wilson, The Alcalde System of 
California (1852), in 1 Cal. 559, 574-575.) However, to the 
extent that any laws of the central government of Mexico ,vere 
in fact observed in California, the province was governed by 
the Constitution of 1837 and the laws of March 20 and May 23 
of the same year.5 An examination of the law of May 23, relat· 
ing to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts, the 
duties and powers of the Attorney General, and civil and 
criminal procedure, reveals no provision authorizing the Attor-
ney General to exercise any power resembling nolle prosequi 
under the common·law. And it may well be doubted that a 
custom to that effect existed, in view of (1) the traditional 
civil·la,v emphasis on the authority of the magistrate, and (2) 
the necessarily broad powers exercised by the alcaldes and 
"The llltter enactments llre set forth in rclcmnt part in Halleck, Trans-
lation anll Digest of such portions of the Mexican Laws of March 20th 
nnd MllY 23d, 1837, llS llre supposed to be still in force and adapted to 
t.he present conditions of California (1849), rcprinted in Browne, Debates 
in the Convention of California (18.30), Appentlbr, pp. XXIV-XL. 
) 
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justiccs of the peace in meting out the primitive justice ofa 
remote and t.roubled province.s 
Neither the proclamation of the California (Bear Flag) 
R!'pnblic on June ]4, 1846, nor thc military conquest and 
occupation of California beginning July 7, 1846, nor the ulti-
mate cession of California to the United Statcs by the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 2, 1848) operated to abro-
gate existing local law. Although many of the American 
settlers conducted their personal and business affairs by the 
only guides they knew-the rules and customs of the common 
law-they did so out of necessity and without authorization of 
any governing body. By established principles of international 
usage, when conquered or ceded territory is transferred to a 
new sovereign "the law, which may be denominated political, 
is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the inter-
course, and general conduct of individuals, rcmains in force, 
until altered by the newly cr!'ated power of the state." 
(American Insurance 00. v. Oanter (1828) 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
511,542 [7 L.Ed. 242] [Louisiana]; accord, Oross v. Harrison 
(1853) 57 U.S. (16 How.) ]64, 198 [14 L.Ed. 889] [Cali-
fornia] .) 
The fact that existing Mexican municipal law remained in 
force in California to the extent that it was not in conflict with 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, was repeatedly 
recognized during the subject period. It was asserted, for ex-
ample, in the proclamation of General Kearny (March 1, 
1847) taking command of the military government of Cali-
fornia under orders of President Polk; in the proclamation of 
Colonel Mason (August 7, 1848) announcing ratification of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and in the proclamation of 
General Riley (June 3, 1849) calling the first constitutional 
convention.T The need to make more widely known the content 
of such existing local law led to the publication, by order of 
General Riley (July 2, 1849), of Halleck's Translation and 
Digest of Mexican Laws (ante, fn. 5), said to be "intended 
'''The Mexican Constitution of 1844, partially adopted in Mexico, was 
never regarded as in force in California, nor was it known here that these 
laws [of March 20 and May 23, 1837] wcre materially modified by any 
decrees or orders of the Mexican Congress." (Hnlleck, p. XXV (ante, 
fn.5).) 
'In the latter proclnmation it was observed, for exnmple, that" The 
laws of California, not inconsistent with the laws, Constitution and 
treaties of the United States, are still in force, and must continue in 
force till changed by competent authority." (Reprinted in Browne, De· 
bates in the Convention of California (1850), p. 3.) 
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us a temporary guide and assistance to the inferior officers 
of GoVel'lmH'nt, till more complete treaties can be prepared 
by competent persons." (Ibid.) And the early volumes of 
thcCaliforuia Reports are replete with decisions of this court 
applying such local law, often as elucidated by Spanish and 
Mexican writers, in causes ,vhich arose in the years prior to 
1850. Thus, "Between the transfer of California to the United 
States, by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the admission 
of this state into the Union,no territorial government was 
here established. The purely municipal law of Mexico con-
tinued in force within this territory until modified or en-
tirely changed by appropriate authority." (Lux v. Haggin 
(1886) 69 Ca1.255, 335 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674].) 
Nor did the adoption and ratification of the Constitution 
of 1849 operate to directly adopt nolle prosequi or even to 
abrogate existing local law iu ally material sense. It is true 
that most of the provisions of that Constitution were modelled 
on corresponding provisions of the Constitutions of Iowa, 
New York,and other common law jurisdictions (see Sander-
son, C. J., dissenting in Bourland v. Hildreth (1864) 26 Cal. 
167, 258; see generally Hunt, The Genesis of California's 
First Constitution (1895» and that "In determining the 
meaning of a constitutional provision, it will be presumed 
that those who framed and adopted it were conversant with 
the interpretation which had been put upon it under the 
constitution from which it was copied" (Lord v. Dunster 
(1889) 79 Cal. 477, 485 [21 P. 865]). But the latter is a rule 
of construction only, which must give way before contempor-
ary evidence of a contrary intent. Here such evidence is 
ample to show that in adopting the Judicial Article--or any 
other provision--of the Constitution of 1849 the framers did 
110t intend thereby to substitute the common law for existing 
Mexican law as t1le rule of decision in California. This intent 
\vas made plain by the adoption ·of section 1 (If the Schedule 
to the Constitution, ,vhich provided in relevant part that 
"all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this Consti-
tution, and not inconsistent therewith, until altered or re-
pealed by the Legislature, shall continue as if the same had 
not been adopted." (Reprinted in Stats. 1850, p. 34.) 
Any doubt that might otherwise exist as to the matter was 
set at rest by the first session of the Legislature. On April 
13, 1850, that body passed an act declaring that" The Common 
Law of England, so far a., it is '1Iot repugnant to or inconsis-
tent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Con-
) 
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stitution or laws 01 the State 01 California, shall be the rule 
of decision in alltlle Courts of tIl is State." (Italics added.) 
(Stats. 1850, ch. 95, p. 219.) II Shortly thereal'ter the Legis-
lature explicitly provided in section 630 of the Criminal 
Practice Act (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, p. 323) that "Neith(>r tbe 
Attorney General, nor the District Attorney, shall hereafter 
discontinue or abandon a prost'cution for a public offense, E'X-
. cept as provided in the last section [§ 629, now Pen. Code, 
§ 1385, ante, fn. 2]."9 . (See also Pen. Code, §§ 1099, 1100. 
1101, specifically providing immunity for a party d~f"'lH'lnllt 
when the charge against him is dismissed by the court in order 
that he may be a witness either for the People (§ 1099) 01' 
fora codefendant (§ 1100).) Finally, the Legislature passed 
an act declaring that "all laws now in force in the State, ex-
cept such as have been passed or adopted by the Legislatur!', 
are hereby repealed .... " (Italics added.) (Stats. 1850, cll. 
125, p. 342.) 
As the common law power of nolle prosequi was manifestl.,r 
"repugnant to or inconsistent with . . . the laws of the State 
of California" as expressed in section 630 of the Criminal 
Practice Act, supra, it is obvious· that although the Legisla-
ture adopted the common law as the general rule of decision 
it expressly declined to adopt that portion of the common 
law which vested the power of nolle prosequi in the prose-
cutor. Section 630 of the Criminal Practice Act was re-enacte(l 
almost verbatim by the second session of the Legislature as 
section 598 of the Criminal Practice Act of 1851 (Stats. 1851, 
ch. 29, p. 279) and that statute remained in force until super-
seded in 1872 by Penal Code section 1386.10 The addition at 
that time of the words, "The entry of a nolle prosequi is 
abolished," was explanatory and confirmatory only; i.e., it 
"It is interesting to note that in his message to the Legislature (Decem-
ber 21, 1849) Govcrnor Burnett had recommended the adoption of the 
English law of evidence and the English criminal and commercial law, 
and the Louisiana Civil Code and Code of Practice. A petition in sup-
port of the Governor's proposal was referred to the' Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, which filed a report (February 27, 1850) reviswing at 
some length the 1'espeetive merits of the civil law and the common law. 
and recommending adoption of the latter. (Report on Civil and Common 
. Law, reprinted in 1 Cal. 588·604.) 
·Sections 629 and 630 were based, tespectivcly, on sections 671 and 672 
of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure. 
"Section 1386 provides as follows: "The entry of a nolle prosequi is 
abolished, and neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney can 
discontinue or abandon a l'rosecution for a public offense, except as pro-
vided in the last scction." 
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added nothing except confirmation to thc legal effect of its 
predecessors under the 1850 and 1851 acts for manifestly it 
could not then abolish that which had never existed in Cali-
fornia. l1 
The majority's appeal to the history of England and of 
such states as Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Louisiana and 
South Carolina serves but to emphasize the lack of authority 
under California law for the Legislature's attempt to trans-
fer a portion of the superior court's constitutionally granted 
jurisdiction from the judicial to the executive department of 
government. The question of how the defendant's case is 
decided is of little importance to anyone other that the de-
fendant; but the question of who decides it-the district at-
torney or the court-is of major importance to all citizens 
as well as to the defendant, to whom it denies due process. 
As hereinabove observed, the implied powers of the courts 
are impracticable if not impossible of all-inclusive enumera-
tion. Yet they flow from a common source--the authority 
of every court "to control the proceedings before it insofar 
as the essentials of the judicial process are concerned" 
(People v. Burke (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 45,52 [6] [301 P.2d 241]). 
The concept of what is an essential part of the judicial 
process, however, is neither static in quality nor fixed in time. 
"In this connection the majorit;r cite People v. Bna:ro (1864) 24 Cal. 
.n, but the case is not relevant to the issue before us. The record there 
showed (id. at p. 51) "a case of joint indictment; joint trial; a request 
or call by the Prosecuting Attorney for one of the defendants for the 
purpose of examining him against the other two; he takes the stand vol· 
untarily in answer to the call: he invites and without objection takes 
the oath in its most comprehensive form, and, under instructions which 
he has previously solicited, and to which he takes no exception when 
given, criminates his associates and himself; and on these antecedents 
the counsel of the witness, in pursuance of a notice previously given, 
moves the Court not merely to discharge the witness from the particular 
prosecution, but to finally acquit him, i'3 effect, of the crime alleged 
agaiMt him." (Italics added.) It was held that "The Court has no 
power to discharge Bruzzo at common law, nor under the Act of 1851 
[i.e., Stats. 1851, ch. 29, p. 252, ~ 368, now Pen. Code, ~ 1099], on the 
motion of his own counsel." (Ibid.) But no such power is here in ques. 
tion, as the dismissal of a charge of prior conviction is effective only for 
sentencing purposes and does not expunge that conviction from the de· 
fendant's record. Nor is the reference in Brllsso to the common lnw of 
any significance here. It cannot be taken to imply that the common law 
was adopted in this state by the Constitution of 1849, as it has been 
shown hereinabove that the fact was otherwise. And although the court 
in Bl"U::ZO looked to the common law as well as to the statutes in search 
of evidence of tIle judieial power t),ere un<1!'r ,liscussion, it docs not 
follow from that fact tlmt in the case at h('nl'h the ('ommoll law power 
of nolle prosequi should be deemed to have somehow been adopted 
despite it.s express rejection by the first ~l's~ion of the Legislature. 
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. Its scope necessarily changes as the machinery of the admin-
i .. tration of justice changes, to meet the new conditions and 
needs of a developing society. To define the essentials of 
the judicial process exclusively in terms of the law as it 
stood in earlier stages of that development "would be to 
make of stale usage a strait-jacket confining our constitu-
tional grants of power, and would be directly contrary to 
the view of the Constitution as a document expanding , "to 
meet the advancing affairs of men.'" (People v. Western 
Air Lines, Inc. [1954] 42 Cal.2d 621, 635 [19] [268 P.2d 
723].)" (California Motor Express, Ltd. v. State Board of 
Equalization (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 237, 242 [5b] [283 P.2d 
1063].) The real issue, therefore, is not whether the hearing 
and determination of the question of dismissing a charge of 
prior conviction was an essential part of the judicial process 
in 1849 or 1872 or 1879; rather, the issue is whether such 
hearing and determination is today an essential part of that 
process. 
Only recently we had occasion to point out that "The 
statutory rules of pleading and procedure in criminal actions 
today are not only different from, but in certain aspects arc 
contraversions of, those which existed under the Practice 
Act of 1851 and even under the Penal Code prior to the 
amendments of 1915 and 1927." (People v. Tidernan (1962) 
57 Cal.2d 574, 578 [1] [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007].) 
In this century alone there have been many changes in the 
criminal law, both substantive and procedural, which give 
a force and effect to a charge of prior conviction, if found 
to be true, that could not have been foreseen by the framers 
of our two Constitutions and our first codes. This effect is 
now felt throughout the entire judicial process. To begin 
with, the charging of all known prior convictions is now 
mandatory on the district attorney. (Pen. Code, § 969; In 
re Tartar (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 250, 254-255 [la, 2, 1b, 3] [339 
P.2d 553] ; see also People v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 
394, 401 [9] f14 Cal.Rptr. 279]; People v. Dunbar (1957) 
153 Cal. App.2d 478, 479 [1] [314 P.2d 517] ; People v. Ash-
craft (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 820, 826 [5] [292 P.2d 676].) 
The finding that a defendant has suffered two or more prior 
convictions of certain felonies will now result in an adju-
dication of habitual criminality (Pen. Code, § 644), with 
its attendant effect in extending the minimum term of im-
prisonment that 11e must serve before being eligible for 
) 
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pal·olc(ic7., §§ 3047·30-18.:;) .EwlI if lie is not auju<lged an 
habitual criminal, a fiutling of prior cOllviction of certain 
felonies will now either diminisb or destroy his eligibility 
for probation (id., § 1203), and may result ill a mandatory 
increase in the minimum term that can be fixed by the 
Adult Authority under the Indeterminate Sentellee Act (id., 
§ § 3020, 3023, 3024). 
More particularly with respect to narcotics violations, 
the statutes (Health & Saf. Code, div. 10) in force at the 
time of defendant's cOllviction (5 October 1960) gave sub-
stantial effect to a finding of priOl' convictioil. Elevcn offcns<,s 
were then defincdil1 chapter 5 ("IUl'gal Narcotics") of 
division 10 of the codt>, and in rl'gal'd to no less than eight 
of them the statute provided for mandatory charging of 
prior narcotics eonvictions and for iucreascdpunishment 
dependent on corresponding findings (id., §~ 11500, 11501, 
11502, 11530, 11[;31, 11532, 11540, 11557). Thus, the court ill 
ihe caf;e at bel1eh (presuming the valiclity of Health & Saf. 
Code,§ 11718, ante, fn. 1) was compelled to deny probation 
(id., § 11715.6) 12 and to sentence defendant to state prison for 
the statutorily increased term of two to twenty years,. rather 
than the basic term of not more than one year in county jail 
or not more than ten years in state prison.13 
In this connection we may take note of the fact that the 
difference, from the standpoint of punishment and rehabili-
tation, between treating a man as a first offender and giving 
effect to a prior conviction will be even greater under the new 
narcotics laws. Section 11500 was amcnded in 1961 (Stat.,;. 
1961, ch. 274, § 1) to provide, in the case of. one prior felony 
narcotics conviction,14 that the defendant "shall be im-
"Section 11715.6 provided in relevant parta~ follows at the time of 
defendant's conviction: "In no case shall any person convicted of [any 
of the narcotics offenses defined in div. 10, ch. 5, of the codel .•• be 
granted probation by the trial court, nor sllaH the execution of the sen-
tence imposed upon such person he suspended by the court, if such person 
has been previously convicted of IIny offense described in this division 
[except § 11721, use of narcoticsl ... " 
The 1961 amendment to section 1171:;.6 (Stats. 1961, ch. 274, § 12) 
adds references \0 two new narcotics offenses (H 11500.5 and 11ii30.::;) 
but makes no SUbstantial changes in the ,vording or effect of the section. 
1IHealth and Safety Code section 11500, liS it provided at the time of 
defendant's conviction. ' 
"Health and Safety Code section 11504 (added by Stats. 1961, ch. 274, 
§ 5) provides: "As used in tliis article r nrt. 1, "Illegal Sale, Possession, 
Administration and Tmnsportntion"l 'felony offense~' aud offense 'pun· 
ishable as a felony' refer to an offense for which the law prescribes 
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prisoned in the state prison for not less than five years nor 
more than 20 years, and shall not be eligible for release upon 
completion of sentence, or on parole, or on any other basis 
until he has served not less than five years in prison." (Italics 
added.) In the case of two or more prior narcotics convic-
tions the corresponding term is now from 15 years to life, 
with a required minimum time served of 15 years. (Ordinarily, 
of course, a prisoner "whose minimum term of imprisonment 
is more than one year, may be paroled at any time after the 
expiration of one-third of the minimum term." (Pen. Code, 
§ 3049.» The remaining sections of articles 1 and 2 of chapter 
5 (tc Illegal Narotics") were similarly amended (Stats. 1961, 
ch. 274, §§ 2-11), increasing in each instance the punishment 
imposed and the required minimum time served in cases of 
one or morc prior narcotics c0l1yictions.15 
The conclusion is ineseapable that a charge of prior con-
viction which is found to be true now has serious and far 
imprisonment in the state prison as either an alternath'e or the sole 
penalty, regal'lUcs8 of the 8entence· the particular defendant received." 
(Italics added.) 
"For convenience of reference, the following chart sets out the respec-
tive effects, under the new narcotics laws, of striking, or of not striking 
and finding to be true, one or more charged prior felony convictions: 
Health & Safety j Disposition of ! Minimum I Maximum I M;:~m 
Code sections I priors charged i Sentence Sentence served 
! I (years) I (years) (years) 
11500 
Simple posses-
sion (except 
marijuana) 
11500.5 
Possession for 
sale 
11501 
Sale or gift or 
offer to give 
or transport 
or furnish -11002 
Sale or gift 
to minor 
i Prior struck or found 
I not true: 1 prior found true: 2 or more priors 
found true: 
Prior struck or found 
not true: 
1 prior found true: 
2 or more true' 
Prior struck or found 
not true: 
1 prior true: 
• 2 or more true: 
I ; I ~g ! ~ 
I 15 I life \ 15 
\ Ig I ~~e \ 15 life 
5 life 
10 life 
15 life 
2% 
6 
15 
3 
10 
15 
not true: 10 life 5 
1 prior true: 10 life 10 I Pnor struck or found I I 
:-=-=:-=-____ 2 or more t;.:r.;;u:.:.e.:.,: ::----:---:._--=1;..:5:-.._....----=I:...if;..:e:.---:-_l;::,5=--_ 
11502.1 I Prior struck or found I I 
Minor's sale or I not true: I 5 life 
gift to minor 11 or more found true: 10 life 
(Footnote continuea OIl lUa:t pGfJe.) 
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reaching effects on the punishment of the offender, and hence 
on the possibility of his eventual rehabilitation. This being 
so, the hearing and determination of the important question 
of dismissing such a charge for the purpose of individualiz-
ing punishment and encouraging rehabilitation-which is 
to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole, and which chiefly 
distinguishes modern penology from the older concepts-
must today, more importantly even than in the past,be 
deemed an essential part of the judicial process. And the 
power to hear and determine that question must, under the 
'principles set forth hereinabove, be deemed an implied con-
stitutional power of the courts of this state.IS 
, 
Neither section 11718 nor section 11500 takes cognizance 
of the fact that there is a vast difference between the culp-
ability of a 'l/,Q1I.-addict possessor-pusher on the one hand,and 
on the other, that of the sick and impoverished addict who, 
desperate for the drug, pushes it in order to possess it. Trial 
judges-before enactment of section 11718-could recognize 
that difference and (by striking a charged prior in what the 
evidence and their experience told them was probably a 
11530 I Prior struck or found I 
Simple posses- not true: 1 10 1 
sion of 1 prior true: 2 20 2 
marijuana· 2 or more true: 5 life 5 
11;)30.5 I Prior struck-or found I 
Possession of I not true: 2 10 I 
marijuana 11 prior true: I 5 15 3 
for sale ,2 or more true: 10 life 8 
11531 I Prior struck or found 
Sale or gift not true: 5 life 3 
or import or 1 prior true: 5 life 5 
transport of ! 2 or more true: 10 life 10 
marijuana 
11532 I Prior struck or found I 
Sale or gift I not true: 10 life 5 
of marijuana 1 prior true: 10 life 10 
to minor 2 or more true: 15 life 15 
"It may Le observed that there appears to be medical opinion that 
mnl'ijuana is tess habit forming and less toxic to tbe human system than 
is tobacco. It seems obvious, therefore, that at some later date a court 
may be considering some equally drastic enactment with respect to to-
hacco. It is not many years since 'We did face quite similar laws affecting 
possession of alcoholic beverages. 
"1 am thus in full agreement with the Committee on Criminal Law 
nnd Procedure of the State Bar of California which, in its recent report 
to the Board of Governors recommending that the 'State Bar sponsor the 
repeal of section 11718, gave as its opinion that" To make the prosecut-
ing offieer the only person who can move to set aside a prior conviction, 
takes away all judicial diseretion in pronouncing sentence nnd is a legis-
lative encroachment upon proper judicial power." (35 State Bar J. 432 
(1960).) 
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descrving ease) give to the Adult Authority greater scope to 
treat such an addict as an illdividual-a very sick and help-
less individual, but in some eases a person who could be 
rehabilitated and cured. 
Referencc to the chart in footnote 15 makes it obvious that 
the Ileed for judicial discretion (in contrast to prosecutor's 
zeal) may be even more important in cases wherein violation 
of Health and Safety Code section 11532 is charged. Under 
that section a youth-exactly 21 years old (with one prior 
charged and found true)-who shared a marijuana cigarette 
with another youth one day younger, would be absolutely 
required to actually serve 10 years in prison. With the prior 
struck the youth, if the Adult Authority saw fit, might be 
paroled after a minimum of five years served. In either case, it 
is to be noted, whether the charge of prior conviction was 
struck or found true, the maximum sentence open to the Adult 
Authority is life imp1'isonment. In its application to a situa-
tion of this kind section 11718, aside from being unconstitu, 
tional, is a throwback toward an abandoned concept of pen-
ology. It works at cross-purposes with the indeterminate 
sentence plan and objectives, 
In connection with the foregoing discussion it should be 
remembered that the dismissal or striking from an accusatory 
pleading of an allegation of prior conviction does not pre-
clude the Adult Authority from considering the fact of a 
prisoner's prior conviction in fixing the term of imprisonment 
and the time for and conditions of parole, if any. The direct 
and important effect of the court's dismissal or striking of 
the charge is to broaden the area of the Adult Authority's 
discretion in fixing the minimum term of imprisonment in 
deserving cases. But solicitude of the law for the protection 
of society against confirmed offenders makes sure that the 
Adult Authority shall be acquainted with all facts which may 
militate against early, or cyen any, parole, The statutes 
provide that: c, The Director of Corrections shall keep com-
plete case records of all prisoners under custody of the depart-
ment, ' . , 
"Case records shall include all information received by 
the Director of Corrections from the courts, probation officers, 
sheriffs, police departments, district attorneys .. , and other 
interested agencies. , . ," (Pen. Code, § 2081.5.) Reports of 
court dispositions arc mandatory. (Pen. Code, §§ 11115, 11116; 
see also Pen. Code, §§ 3020, 3024, 3041, 3046.) Furthermore 
) 
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"any persoll who is hereaftrr dischal'ged or parolrd from a 
penal institution where he was confined because or th" com-
mission of any such [narcotics] ofi\'llse ... shall within thirty 
days ... of his coming into any county or city ... register 
with the chief of police ... or the ;;heriff" (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11850). 
Just six years ago in a substantially similar context the 
same question was presented to us and we deliberately con-
sidered and passed on it (People v. BlI?'ke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 
45 [301 P.2d 241]). We were then unanimous and we held 
(at p. 51 [4]): "The power to strike or dismiss the proceed-
ing as to a prior conviction is within the power referred to 
in section 1385 of the Penal Code, which provides that 'The 
court may, either of its own motion or upon the application 
of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, 
order an action to be dismissed. . . .' The authority to dis-
miss the whole includes, of course, the power to dismiss or 
'strike out' a part .... 
"[6] The People argue that by providing in section 11712 
of the Health and Safety Code that if a prior conviction, 
whether of misdemt'anor or feJony, 'is admitted by the de-
fendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison' (italics 
added) the Legislature intended to take from the court the 
power to dismiss or strike a charge of prior conviction if the 
defendant admits the charge. According to the People, the 
trial court was required to sentence defendant to state prison 
and the judgment should be reversed for the purpose of 
directing it to do so .... 
"[P. 52] The cited cases-and the statutes referred to-
do not purport to divest the trial court (or to hold that the 
court constitutionally could be divested) of the power to 
control the proceedings before it insofar as the essentials of 
the judicial process are concerned; i.e., to find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty of any offense charged, or of a lesser in-
cluded offense, or to dismiss the action in toto or to strike or 
dismiss as to any or all of multiple counts 01' charges of prior 
conviction. The'statutes in question do validly-and in respect 
to constitutionally vested judicial power they neither purport 
to nor validly could do more than-prescribe the sentence 
which must be imposed upon the appropriate adjudication 
of guilt of the substantive crime and judicial determination 
of the factor which results in increased punishment. Such 
adjudication and judicial determination are inherently and 
essentially the province of the court even as the punishment 
) 
) 
Oct. 1962] PEOPLE V. SIDENER 
{58 C.2d 645; 23 Cal.Rptr. 697. 375 P.2d 641] 
669 
which mayor must follow the offense adjudicated, either with 
or without a punishment augmentation factor, is essentially 
for the Legislature except as it may vest an area of discretion 
ill the court or administrative body. (See People v. Gowasky 
(1927) 244 N. Y.451 [155 N. E. 737,749,58 A.L.R. 9, 17].)" 
(See also People v. Be11jamin (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 164, 173 
[15] [315 P.2d 896] ; People v. Green (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 
886, 891 [6] [313 P.2d 995] ; People v. Harris (1956) 146 
Cal.App.2d 142, 147-148 [7] [304 P.2d 178].) And only five 
years ago, again unanimously, in People v. Valenti (1957) 49 
Ca1.2d 199, 206 [9] [316 P.2d 633], we further recognized 
that a charge of prior conviction may be dismissed by the 
court "in the exercise. of [its] inherent power to control 
the proceedings before it," and that section 1385 is merely 
"evidential of" that power. 
The broad scope of the judicial power in this area of its 
jurisdiction, although sometimes attacked by zealous prose-
cutors, has not been seriously doubted until today. As the 
District Court of Appeal said in People v. Superior Oourt 
(1921) 53 Cal.App. 185, 186 [199 P. 840] (relying on this 
court's decision in People v. More (1886) 71 Cal. 546 [12 P. 
631]), "We think that respondent [superior court] has 
jurisdiction to dismiss the action for any reason that it deter-
mines to be in furtherance of justice." To the same effect is 
People v. Jfartin (1924) 70 Cal.App. 271, 276 [6] [233 P. 85] : 
"The action of the trial court on such a motion [to dismiss 
under Pen. Code, § 1385] is discretionary." In People v. 
Smith (1925) 76 Cal.App. 105, 111 [5] [243 P. 882], the 
court declared: "At most, the motion [by the district at-
torney] for a dismissal is merely a recommendation to the 
court. If the court, for any reason, differs with the district 
attorney ... there can be no doubt that the court has a full 
right to refuse such dismissal." And in People v. Ward (1890) 
85 Cal. 585, 590 [24 P. 785], we held, "It is clear ... 'the 
court' alone has the power to dismiss a criminal action." 
The Legislature may enact reasonable regulations to be 
observed in carrying out the constitutional functions of the 
courts (such as prescribing the records to be kept and the 
procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised) "provided 
they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those 
functions." (Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929), supra, 208 
Cal. 439, 444 14].) Here, it is apparent that the effect of 
Health and Safety Code section 11718 was to utterly defeat 
the exercise by the trial court of the above delineated judicial 
rJ 
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function. The court felt tl1at it had .. no discrction," and that 
the statute "tied the hands" of the court. It follows that 
section 11718 effectively deprived defendant of his constitu-
tional right to a "judicial determination of the factor which 
results in increased punishment" (People.v. Burke (1956), 
supra, p. 52 [6] of 47 Cal.2d), and hence denied him due 
process of law in the important matter of probation and sen-
tencing. (U.S. Const.,5th and 14th Amends.; Ca1.00nst.,.art. 
I, § 13.) 
Furthermore, it is to be noted, the jurisdiction held by the 
majority to beexeised by force of Health and Safety Code 
section 11718 is not only the original jurisdiction. of the 
superior court but also the potentialappellatc jurisdiction 
of this court. In People v.VaZent·i (1957), supra, 49 Cal.2d 199 
207, we specifically approved the holding in the Burke case 
that the trial court's order striking the allegation of prior 
conviction "was appealable, not because it was made • in 
furtherance of justice,' but because, as we there stated (p. 53 
[8] of 47 Cal.2d) it ',vas in its nature one of the orders spec-
ified as appealable either by paragraph 1 or by paragraph 6 
of section 1238 of the Penal Code. That statute provides 
that the People may appeal" 1. From an order setting aside 
the indictment, information or complaint; . . . 6. From an 
order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the 
degree of the offense or the punishment imposed." The trial 
court's action was in substance .. an order setting aside [a 
part of] the •.• information." , Since the But'ke case order 
did not involve either the cause of adion itself or any 
question of jeopardy it was clearly proper to hold, as we 
did, that it 'was in substance "an order setting aside [a part 
of] the ... information" , and, consequeI;ltly, that as to ap-
pealability it should be governed by the rules applicable to 
orders setting aside the information rather than by those 
applicable to orders dismissing the action." Thus it is 
established law that if the district attorney feels that the trial 
court has abused its discretion or erred in an order setting 
aside or striking a part of an accusatory pleading the remedy 
of appeal is available. But if, as the majority today hold, 
seetion 11718 effectively transfers to the district attorney 
unreviewable authority to compel the trial court to deny 
the motion-or to not even consider and pass on it~then ill-
Ilecd is the defendant denied due process both in the trial 
court and (to resist on plaintiff's appeal) ill this court, 
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The Scpa1'ati01~ of Powers 
Article III, section 1, of the California Constitution pro-
vides-as it has provided in substance since adoption of our 
first Constitution (i.e., since 1849)-that "The powers of the 
government of the State of California shall be divided into 
three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and 
judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exer-
cise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except 
as in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted." 
It is my view that section 11718 of the Health and Safety 
Code is unconstitutional for the further reason that, both 
on its face and as here applied, it violates this requirement of 
separation of powers by subjecting the exercise of an inher-
ently judicial function to the unfettered and unreviewable 
discretion of the district attorney, a member of the executive 
branch of government. 
It will be remembered that section 11718 (ante, fn. 1) pro-
hibits the trial court from hearing and determining the 
question of whether a charge of prior conviction should be 
dismissed, "except upon motion of the district attorney." 
Under this statute, no matter how deserving the individual 
case may be for judicial action, the court must wait upon the 
permission of the district attorney before proceeding further, 
and if such permission is not forthcoming the court's hands 
are "tied" and it cannot act. As defendant correctly points 
out, "The court is precluded from exercising its judgment 
in a fact situation before it, unless the district attorney gives 
the judicial prerogative what might be termed a 'prior 
approval.' " To endow a member of the executive department 
with such a power is in effect to authorize him, in the language 
of article III, section 1, to "exercise" one of the "functions 
appertaining to" the judicial department. 
It is true, of course, that in the complex state of modern 
government the principle of the separation of powers should 
not be treated as absolute, and that each branch of government 
must of necessity and in some degree exercise certain functions 
of the others. But that principle nevertheless requires, when a 
judicial function is exercised by a member of the executive 
branch, that ultimate control over its exercise be retained by 
the courts through the medium of judicial review. Much of the 
increasingly elaborate structure of our administrative agen-
.cies, as is well known, has been erected and sustained upon 
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tl1is foundation. Under the subjt'rt statutl', however, a decision 
of the district attorney not to initiate a motion to dismiss 
is not reviewable by any court in any type of proceeding. Thus, 
on the present appeal, we cannot review the propriety of the 
district attorney's decision itself,but must confine ourselves 
to examining the authority under which it was made. Indeed, 
even in a case where, for example, the prior narcotics offense 
occurred a half century carlier and the defendant successfully 
served a period of probation, was rehabilitated and became a 
useful member of society, the district attorney would not be 
judicially accountable for a refm'al to allow the trial court 
to consider dismissing the charge of the old conviction and 
treating the defendant as a first offender. Section 11718 i:-; 
therefore invalid for this reason also, as non reviewable or ulti-
mate judicial power ma~' not constitutionally be delegated to a 
member of the executive department. (Cal. Const., art. III, 
§ 1; Laisnev. California State Board of Optometry (1942) 19 
Cal.2d 831, 835 [3] [123 P.2d 457).) 
Nor can it be presumed that the district attorney will act 
with judicial impartiality in exercising this power. The major-
ity assert (ante, p. 651) that "The Legislature is authorized 
to provide that part of the powers that might otherwise be 
exercised by the Adult Authority alone shall be cxercised by 
district attorneys." But the Adult Authority has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the judicial process leading to entry 
of judgment. It has no po\ver to superintend the trial of cases 
in the courts or to participate in any way in the determination 
of the guilt or innocence or the scope of the judgment of 
conviction of any person who is brought to trial in the superior 
court on a charge of felony. Manifestly the power of the Legis-
lature to provide for the administration of prisons and pris-
oners is not the equivalent of authority to transfer a judicial 
function to the executive department. 
The proposition asserted by the majority is based on article 
X, section 1, of our Constitution, which provides in relevant 
part that "the Legislature may delegate the government, 
charge and superintendence of [state prisons] to any public 
governmental agency or agencies, officers, or board or boards . 
. . . " In enacting section 11718, say the majority, "the Legis-
lature in the exercise of its [just quoted] constitutional power 
has simply chosen one public officer rather than another." 
(Ante, p. 652.) It appears to me that this contention lacb 
substance as support for the majority's essential conclusion 
that the Legislature effectively transferred from the superior 
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court judge to the district attorncy the jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate this phase of the criminal action against uefclldant. To 
authorize the prosecutor to sit in final judgment on the resolu-
tion of one of the substantial issues in the case of People v. 
Sidener while this case was· on trial in the superior court is, 
in my opinion, flagrantly to disregard the painfully learned 
truths which are the very foundation of our constitutional sys· 
tern of government. If indeed the Legislature has here "simply 
chosen one public officer rather than another," the choice is 
110t only a dangerous and unwise one-it nakedly violates the 
letter and spirit of both the Constitution of California and 
the Constitution of the United States. 
If Health and Safety Code section 11718, in seeking to 
secure its objective, went one step further and declared that 
no application to the Govcrnor for pardon, or commntation of 
sentence, imposed for a narcotics offense "may be" granted 
"except upon motion of the district attorney," would such 
transfer of jurisdiction even from one executive officer to 
another in the samc department of government be sustained? 
The vesting in the Governor of the constitutional powers of 
pardon and commutation, subject to control in certain situ-
ations by the Supreme Court, is no more exclusive than is the 
vesting of judicial power in the constitutional courts. 
I am 110t unmindful of our duty to so construe legislation as 
to save its constitutionality if that can reasonably be done 
(Erlich v. Municipal COll1't (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 553, 558 [1] [11 
Cal.Rptr. 758, 360 P.2d 334] ; Geiger v. Board of Supervisors 
(1957) 48 Ca1.2d 832, 839 [11] (313 P.2d 545J ; Palermo v. 
Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 53, 60 [5] [195 P.2d 
1]), bnt in my view section 11718 of the Health and Safety 
Code admits of no donbt either as to its meaning or as to its 
effect. In these circumstances "the duty of the court is plain, 
and should be fearlessly performed." (Van Harlingen v. 
Doyle (1901) 134 Cal. 53, 56 [66 P. 44, 54 L.R.A. 771] ; cf. 
City of Los Angeles v. Offner (1961) 55 Cal.2d 103, 113 [7) 
[10 Cal.Rptr. 470, 358 P.2d 926).) 
Apart from principle the step taken by the majority today 
may not be a big step. But in principle it is indubitably a step 
toward totalitarian concentration of power in the executive; a 
power to be exercised without any legislative standard and 
without possibility of judicial review. As applied here it 
deprives the defendant of due process and of equal protection 
of the law. 
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded 
• C.Jd-D 
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for judicial determination, which in the circumstances means 
for redetermination in the light of the views herein expressed, 
of the question of dismissal of the charge of defendant's prior 
conviction, and for pronouncement of a new (but not neces-
sarily different) judgment in accordance with such determi-
nation. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
WHITE, J., Dissenting.-I am in accord and concur with 
the historical narrative and legal reasoning contained in the 
dissenting opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Schauer. 
While the Legislature is empowered to place certain reaS011-
able restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts, 
nevertheless, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, the legis-
lative prerogative in that regard is limited to such restrictions 
as "do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those 
[judicial] functions." And, as recently as 1956, in Peop~e v. 
Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45 [301 P.2d 241], this court held that the 
determination of the factor which results in the imposition of 
increased punishment is inherently vested in the courts. 
I view with alarm this invasion of the powers of the judicial 
department of government by the legislative department. If 
the power of the courts, in the interest of justice, to control 
the dismissal of a prior conviction can be made subject to the 
approval of the district attorney, then what is to prevent the 
Legislature from providing that the finding as to whether an 
allegation of a prior conviction is true or untrue under the 
laws of this state shall also be vested in the district attorney T 
I sometimes think we are inclined to' forget that under our 
philosophy of government the district attorney is but the 
representative of just another litigant in a criminal prosecu-
tion. He is invested with the powcr to institute prosecutions 
but once he has done so, the determination of the truth or 
falsity of such accusations is for the courts. 
Another alarming feature of the statute here' under consid-
eration is that, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Schauer, it takes 
away all juliicial discretion in the pronouncement of sentence 
and invests the district attorney with plenary power to control 
the pronouncement of judgment without any right of judicia~ 
review. 
Such an enactment under the American way of life seems 
to me the very essence of slavery and a return to the philoso-
phy of "the Divine Right of Kings." After all, the district 
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attorney cannot bcrcgarded as impartial. He is essentially 
an advocate who, believing in the justice of his cause, is seek-
ingcouvictioll .and punishment of the accused. To make llim 
also the court of last r('sort as to what punishment should be 
imposed, without ailY impartial tribunal to review his decision 
'in the matter of senteneing, seems to me to do violence to our 
concept of constitutional government, and offends our ort 
repeated and proud boast that we are a government of law 
and not of men. 
I regard section 11718 of the Health and Safety Code, now 
engaging our attention,as a legislative encroachment upon 
proper judicial power and therefore, unconstitutional. 
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the 
court below for further proceedings as set forth in the last 
paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer. 
McComb, J.,concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
21, 1962. ,Schauer, J., and MeComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
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